Introduction
In [15] the notion of relative' interpretability between theories was introduced. Intuitively, "T interprets S" means that the language of S can be translated into the language of T in such a way that T proves the translation of every theorem of S. In [4, 171 a model theory of the propositional logic ILM with the binary modality D was studied.
As was proved later, ILM is the complete logic of interpretability over PA (Peano arithmetic). That is, ILM yields exactly the schemata of PA-provable arithmetical sentences, if we understand A D B as a formalization of the assertion "PA + A interprets PA + B". This result, the arithmetical completeness of ILM, was independently obtained by Berarducci [2] and Shavrukov [13] . Another interesting binary relation between theories, weak interpretability, was introduced in [15] : S is weakly interpretable in T, if S is interpretable in some consistent extension of T in the language of T. Intuitively, "T weakly interprets S" means that the language of S can be translated into the language of Tin such a way that the translations of theorems of S are consistent with T.
Unlike interpretability, weak interpretability does not naturally have to be restricted to the binary case, and we introduce the notion of tolerance that is a natural generalization of that of weak interpretability:
A tree Tr(T,, . . . , T,,) of theories Ti, . . . , T, is said to be tolerant, if there are consistent extensions T:, . . . , T,+ of T,, . . . , T, such that each TT interprets its successors in the tree Tr(T:, . . . , Tz).
Consider a particular example. Let Tr = Tr(T, R, S, T) be the tree of theories displayed in Fig. 1 . Then the intuitive gist of the statement "Tr is tolerant" is the following: (the theorems of) the theories Q and T can be translated into the language of S and added to S; the augmented S and the theory R can be translated into the language of T and added to T; moving downward in this way, we obtain a kind of 'avalanche' of information contained in these theories. The tolerance of Tr means that this 'avalanche' is consistent (i.e., there is a way of translating that leads to the consistent 'avalanche').
In Section 4 we axiomatically define the decidable modal propositional logic TLR with the following modal formation rule: if Tr is a (finite) tree of formulas, then OTr is a formula. It is proved that TLR is sound (Section 7) and complete (Section 8) as the logic of tolerance over PA. That is, TLR yields exactly the schemata of PA-provable arithmetical sentences if OTr(AI, . . . , A,) is understood as a formalization of the assertion "Tr(PA + A 1, . . . , PA + A,) is tolerant". In Section 9 we define the decidable extension TLRw of TLR which yields exactly the schemata of true arithmetical sentences.
De Jongh and Veltman [4] introduced a Kripke-like semantics for ILM and proved the soundness and the completeness of ILM with respect to it. Visser [17] simplified this semantics and proved the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. We call the simplified de Jongh's and Veltman's models 'Visser models'. As we show in Section 4, TLR, too, is sound and complete with respect to Visser models (of course, with a different kind of forcing relation). The author of the logic of ,Y,-interpolability did not suspect that in the language of ELH, a metarelation that seems much more interesting than _Z,-interpolability,was expressible.
Each of Berarducci
Only later, in [6] , it was shown that the relation "there is a Z,-sentence F such that PA k (A -+ F) A (F-, B) " is equivalent to "PA +lB is not weakly interpretable in PA + A". It means that Ignatiev's logic can be regarded as the logic of the binary relation of weak interpretability (in its original, non-generalized version) over PA.
In We see that the language of TOL is a fragment of TLR; on the other hand, Ignatiev's modality A ++ B can be expressed in the language of TLR by lt) (A, -IB) ; it means that the language of ELH is a fragment of the language of TOL. In fact in each case the inclusion of the languages is essentially proper. In [6] , TOL was called 'the logic of tolerance'.
But now we prefer to call TOL 'the logic of linear tolerance', maintaining the name 'the logic of tolerance' for TLR. The arrows in Fig. 2 that summarizes the above-said, demonstrate the 'more general'-relation between logics GL (the logic of provability, with the modality •i for the provability predicate), ILM, the Cl, Z,-fragment of HGL (denoted by HGL-), ELH, TOL and TLR; in parentheses the names of the authors of the corresponding arithmetical completeness theorems are indicated. The logics HGL-, ELH and TOL are described in Appendix A. In Section 10 we show that the language of TLR is strong enough to express any n-ary metarelation of the type "for all ,X,-sentences F,, . . . , Fk there are _Z,-sentences Fk+l, . . . , F, such that PA t BY, where Bl is any Boolean combination of F,, . . . , F,, Al, . . . , A,. It means that TLR axiomatizes a considerable fragment of provability logic with quantifiers over Z,-propositions. The strength of the language of TOL is not enough for this. Note that ,Y,-interpolability is a typical example of a metarelation of the above-mentioned type (with k = 0, m = 1 and n = 2).
In Section 3 we introduce two more relations between theories called 'cointerpretability ' and 'cotolerance'. They are in a sense dual to the interpretability and tolerance relations. Intuitively, "S is cointerpretable in T" means that the language of T can be translated into the language of S in such a way that T proves every formula the translation of which is provable in S.
And "Tr is cotolerant", where Tr is determined by Fig. 1 , means the following. We translate the language of S into the languages of Q and T and then add to S every sentence the Q-translation of which is provable in Q or the T-translation of which is provable in T; denote the augmented S by S+. Then we translate the language of T into the languages of R and S and add to T every sentence the R-translation of which is provable in R or the S-translation of which is provable in S+; denote the augmented T by T+. If there is a way of doing translations that leads to the consistent T+, then (and only then) we say that Tr is cotolerant.
We show in Appendix B that for essentially reflexive theories cointerpretability and XI-conservativity are the same. This is a solution of the problem of finding a characterization of .Z,-conservativity in terms of translations, which was left open in [S] as a presumably difficult question.
The logic of cointerpretability is not studied at all, and this task seems to be much more difficult than studying the logic of interpretability. As for cotolerance, we show in Sections 2 and 3 that this relation is expressible in terms of linear tolerance, i.e., tolerance of linear trees; it means that TOL can be regarded as the logic of cotolerance (but not as the logic of the nonrestricted relation of tolerance) over PA.
Trees
Dejinitions, notation and terminology 1.1. A finite irreflexive tree is a pair [m, i], where M is a finite nonempty set, < is a transitive irreflexive relation on Ju, and the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) thereisdEMsuchthatforanyd#aEM, Since no other kinds of trees will be considered in this paper, we shall usually omit the words 'finite irreflexive' and say simply 'a tree'. Note that the above signs < and < are, in fact, metavariables for relations. The signs < and c are reserved for the usual relations 'is less than' and 'is less than or equal to' on natural numbers.
1.3. We say that (Y is an evaluator of a tree [m, <] (or, simply, of M), iff (Y is a function : M+-S for some set S; when we want to indicate that S is the range of ff, we say "a is an evaluator of [M, <] (or, of M) in S". Usually, S will be a set of theories, formulas or 'possible worlds'. 1.6. The signs G and c are used in their usual meaning for "is a subset" and "is a
1.4.
proper subset" relations between sets. Besides, we use these signs to denote relations between trees and evaluated trees: <'I c [M, -x) and (Y' is the evaluator of M' such that c?(a) = a(a) for each a E M'. [M, <, a~] be an evaluated tree. Then: [M, iId and [M, <, (~1~ denote [M', and [M', <', CC] , respectively, where M' = {d<}, and <' and a' are the restrictions of < and a to M'. [M, <, a] and [M', -c', a'] 
Let
1. We say that a tree [M', <'I (resp. an evaluated tree [M', <I, CL']) is an initial part of [M, <] (resp. of [M, -c, a]), iff [M', <'I c [M, <] (resp. [M', -c', a?]~ [M, <, LY]) and for all a, b EM, if a -K b and b EM', then a E M'.
For any d EM,

Suppose
Clearly = is an equivalence relation. 1.14. Let [ Tr2] and [ Tr,] = [M, , -c~, cu,] be evaluated trees. We say that ( Tr2) is a duplicate of (Tr,), iff (7'~~) = (7'rJ +d (Tr,), for some d E M, . [M, <] or an evaluated tree [M, -c, a ] is said to be linear, iff -C is linear (i.e., for all a, b EM, a <b or b X a, unless a = b). M', <', CX'] , where M' = (1, . . . , n} for some II 3 1 and <' is the usual relation 'is less than' on natural numbers (CC' is determined uniquely). Then, instead of (M, -c, a), we can write (v,, . . . , u,) , where u,, . . . , u, are the values of m'(l), . . . , d(n).
A tree
II,-and &-consistency
2.1. Terminology.
1. By a 'sentence' we mean a closed first-order formula.
2. An 'arithmetical formula (sentence)' means a formula (sentence) of the language of PA (Peano Arithmetic, cf. [3] ).
3. By a 'theory' we mean an arithmetically definable theory formulated in first-order logic with identity. Each theory is determined by a language and a set of sentences in this language, regarded as its extra-logical axioms. For simplicity we assume that the languages of the theories we consider (including PA) contain only a finite number of predicate constants and do not contain functional or individual constants.
4. "A theory T contains a theory S" means that the language of T contains the language of S and T proves every theorem of S.
5. A 'finite extension' of a theory T means an extension of T by one additional axiom in the language of T.
6. By a 'superarithmetical theory' we mean a r. 3. If M is a finite set of formulas, then AM (resp. V M) denotes the conjunction (resp. the disjunction) of all the elements of M. The empty conjunction (resp. disjunction) is identified with T (resp. I).
4. If M is a set of sets, then lJ M denotes the union of the elements of M. Proof. Argue in PA. According to 2.5, it is enough to show that the following two assertions are equivalent.
(i) there are III-sentences F,, . . . , F, such that PA t-lF, and for each l<iCn, L&kA{g:i<j}-+fi;
(ii) there are .E,-sentences E,, . . . , E, such that PA tlE, and for each l<iGn, ~k~{Ej:i>j}+Ej.
It is easy to check that (i) implies (ii), if we set E, = 1A (4: i < j}, and (ii) implies (i), if we set (6 = 1A {E,: i > j}. Then a number II is said to be a regular witness for a _Z,!-sentence F, iff @(ii, IF]) is true; and n is a regular counterwitness for a I17,!-sentence Vz E iff n is a regular witness for the Z,!-sentence 32 1E. The results of Section 10 together with Lemma 2.5 will imply that Z,-consistency of trees of finite extensions of PA is expressible in terms of II,-consistency. But the reverse doesn't hold: in general (unlike the situation we have in the linear case), 117,-consistency cannot be defined in terms of _Z,-consistency. A proof of this negative fact is given in Appendix A.
2.8.
The following Theorem 2.9 together with Lemma 2.6 imply something more than that E,-consistency is expressible in terms of I7,consistency.
Namely, we have that ,X,-consistency is expressible in terms of II,-consistency of linear trees of theories: (It follows from 2.6 and the above comments that the theorem doesn't hold if 'Xi' is replaced by 'Iii'.)
Proof. Argue in PA.
Fix a tree [M, <, a] of superarithmetical theories. (+): Let S be the set of all the sequences s = (a,, . . . , a,) (including the empty sequence ( )) of elements of M such that: (1) for all i s i <j s n, ui # uj and (2) for all I. 1 <'<rraandbEM, ifui<b, thenb=ujforsomei<j. For a sequence s = (a,, . . . a,) E S, "b E s" means that b E {a,, . . . , a,} and "U ES" means that U c {a,, . . . , a,}.
We say that an element s of S is complete, iff M c s. Let SC be the set of all complete elements of S. (1) e(x + 1) =s, ifs = (a, b,, . . . , b,) E S and for each r E SC such that s is an ending segment of r, Fi has a <X regular witness;
(2) otherwise, e(x + 1) = e(x). It is easy to see that:
2.9.1. (PA 1:) lfe(x) =s, then, f or all y > x, s is an ending segment of e(y).
It follows from 2.9.1 that:
2.9.2. (PA 1:) e has a limit.
Let Lim denote this limit. Argue in a(a). Suppose s = Lim. Fix a number x such that e(y) =s for all y ax. By 2.9.3, for each r E SC such that (a, b,, . . , b,) is an ending segment of r, FL is true; it means that there is z ax for which every such FL has a 6z regular witness (for, by 2.7(b), every true Z,!-sentence has arbitrary large regular witnesses). Then, by the definition of e, e(z + 1) = (a, b,, . . . , 6,) fs, a contradiction. 0
For each a EM, let E, be a Z,-formalization of the assertion "there is x such that a E e(x)". 2.9.5. For each a EM, a(a) 1 r\{Eb: a < b} + E,.
Proof. Argue in a(a). Suppose r\{Eh: a <b}. Then if follows easily from 2.9.1-2 that {b: a < 6) c Lim, whence, by 2.9.4, a E Lim. And a E Lim clearly implies E,. Cl 2.9.6. PA k-ERooT,M, <,. Consider an arbitrary linear analog [M, <', a] of [M, <, (u] . Observe that ROOT[M, <'I= ROOT[M, ~1; and, since a <b implies u <' b, the above two conditions with < replaced by <' continue to be satisfied. It means by 2.5 that [M, <', a] is ,Z,-inconsistent. 0
What is so interesting about ZI,-and &-consistency?
3.1. Definition. Let L and L' be first-order languages (without functional
is a function t which assigns to each formula F of L a formula tF of L' with exactly the same free variables, such that for some fixed formula 6(x) (with only x free), we have:
is Vx (6(x)* tF) and t(3x F) is 3x (6(x) A tF); 2. t commutes with the operation of substitution of free variables: if tF(xl, . . . , x,) is F'(xl, . . . ,x,), then tF(yl, . . . , y,J is F'(y,, . . . , y,J; 3. t commutes with Boolean connectives; 4. t(x=y) isx=y.* 3.2. Notation. Suppose t is a translation from the language of a theory S into the language of a theory T. Then: (a) t(S) denotes th e set of all sentences tF with S t F; (b) t-'(T) denotes the set of all sentences F with T t tF.
3.3. Definition. Let T and S be theories.
(a) S is interpretable in T iff there is a translation t from the language of S into the language of T such that T proves every F E t(S).
(b) S is cointerpretable in T iff there is a translation t from the language of T into the language of S such that T proves every F E t-'(s).
*In fact all the lemmas and theorems of the present section will continue to hold if we take Definition 3.1 without clause 4, or if we demand the formula 6(x) to be 'vacuous', e.g. x = Y. 
cointerpretable) in a'(u).
The clause (a) of the following Theorem 3.6 is due to Hajek [9] (see also in [8] ). The proof uses Orey's [12] ( see also [7] ) theorem, according to which S is interpretable in T iff T proves the consistency of every finite subtheory of S. As for the clause (b), up to now it has not been known. We give a proof of it in Appendix B.
Theorem. (PA 1:) For all superarithmetical theories T and S, (a) S is interpretable in Tiff S is III-conservative over T; (b) S is cointerpretuble in T iff S is 2,-conservative over T.
It follows immediately from 2.4, 3.5 and 3.6 that:
3.7. Theorem. (PA 1:) A tree of superarithmetical theories is tolerant (resp. cotolerunt) iff it is II,-(resp. E,-) consistent.
3.8. Remark. Non-tolerance can be regarded as a generalization of the notion of inconsistency and hence of provability.
The following argument shows that in certain cases this approach enables us to prove new 'truths' which weren't derivable in initial theories. Notice that the above-mentioned list is in fact a complete and non-redundant enumeration of all =-equivalence classes of trees, if we change the square brackets [a . -1 to (a --).
One can easily calculate that, e.g., k, = k2 = 1, k, = 2, k4 = 3, k, = 5. 
4.1.2.
Lemma. TLR !-O(M, <, a)-+ O(M, -c, (YJ v O(M, <, a,), if there is a E M such that aI =a CXY=~ cu, and a(u) = al(u) v ~~(a).
Proof. Assume the above conditions.
Let CX~ =O o and c+(u) = a(u) A ia$u). We have:
(1) (2) TLR F C&Z) -+ au,(u) (a tautology);
Now, the desired condition follows from (1) Proof.
(1) -c, (u) , where m = {a}, < is empty and a(a) = T A o(Tr). Then, by 4.2.4c,
Clearly ( Proof. Assume the above conditions.
Let a3 =a cy, and Q(U) = O(Tr). We have:
The desired formula follows from (l), (2), (3) Proof. Assume the above conditions. Let a3 and a4 be evaluators of M such that a3 =d aI =d a4,
a3(d) = al(d) ~l(q(d) A O(M, (, q)) and a4(d) = w(d) A O(M, <, a,).
We have:
(8)
(from (l), (3), (4), (6) by propositional logic);
( (7) 4.7).
Now the desired condition follows from (8) (1) there is O(Tr') E w such that +(~r') E root(M, <, cr); (2) if +(Tr') E w, then lO(7'r') E root(M, -c, CX); 
for all a E Ml, cq(u) = al(u) and for all a E M, c+(u) = (Y(U).
And suppose that not w G (Tr2). We want to show that not w G (Tr,). It is easy to see that if the reason for not w G (Tr2) is that one of the conditions 5.3.3.1-3 is not satisfied, then the same conditions fail for w G (Tr,) and so we will have not w G (Tr,). Now suppose that the reason for not w G (7'rJ is that the condition We define a function h ' : M4 + Ml as follows: for each a E M4, h'u = ha, if ha E M,, and h'a = c, if (d <, c and) ha = ic E M. It is easy to check that we have:
(9) for all a, b E M4, hu<,hb j h'u<,h'b;
(10) for all a E M4, az(hu) = a,(h'u).
Now, (4)-(8)
together with (9) and (10) (and thus, not w G (Tr,) , a contradiction).
Indeed, the condition 5.3.3.4(a) is just (4), and (b), (c), (d) we get from (5), (6), (7) (1) TLRk/j w++(Tr');
TLRk O(P+(4)+O(OW')) ((9, 4.3);
) (4) 4.6);
(6) TLRk/\w++(M, <, /I+) ((I)? (5)).
(ii) The reason for not w G (M, < , /3) is that the condition 5.3.3.3 is not satisfied, i.e., there are a < 6 and lO(Tr') E P(a) with O(Tr') E P(b). Thus we have:
(1)
TLRkB+ ( The implication in (6) below can be derived in TLR using several times the axioms 4.2.4c, 4.2.4a and Lemma 4.3: And a finite Visser model (V, R, D, II-) is said to be strengthened iff it has the following additional property: 5. wRuSv+wRv (all w, U, u).
Lemma. If there is a finite TLR-countermodel for A, then there is a finite strengthened Visser countermodel for A.
Proof. The proof partially uses some technical ideas developed by Visser in [17].
Assume that (W, G, II-) is a finite TLR-countermodel for A. 'The tuples we call Visser models, have in fact only common frames (i.e., the part (V, R, S)) with the models for ILM studied by Visser [17] . The forcing relations are, of course, defined in different ways, as the languages of TLR and ILM are different.
If w E V, we use w" to denote root Last(w). 3. If (Y is an evaluator of a set M in V, then a0 denotes the evaluator of M in W such that for each (Y E M, c?(a) = (a(a))'.
The following lemma follows easily from 5.2.3a and 5.2.3~: 
d-) [M-, x-7 P-1 c [M*, 4*, P*]; (e-) for each a E M-, CC(U) c (M*, -c*, &
We 
[M', <', p'] = [M*, <*, /3*] +,, [M**, <**, p**].
We now want to show that (c), (d) and (e) are satisfied. On the other hand, by the definition of /3, root a(c) = /3(c). Consequently,
holds.
The (+) direction of (4) trivially holds because, according to our choice of c, there is no a E M with c < a. And the (e) part also holds because {a: c <' a} = (M** -{c}) and (M** -{c}) II M = 0. 6.3.10. Lemma.
Let us now check (5)
.
Suppose w E V and [Tr] = [M, 4, a] is a tree of elements of V such that:
(1) for each a E M, w R a(u);
(2) for all a < b, a(u) S a(b).
Then w" G (M, <, a?).
Proof. By induction on Rank(Tr).
Assume the conditions of the lemma.
Suppose Rank(Tr) = 0. It means that (3) for all a < b, Last(a(b)) s Last(a(u)).
From (1) we have w R root(Tr), whence, by 6.3.7, (7), (2) and 6.2.5 (taking 6.3.5 into account) that the condition (1) (as well as (2)) Now, (9) and (8) 3. For an arithmetical formula F, Pr( rF1) abbreviates lCn(lF). 4. If LY is an evaluator of a set M in the set of TLR-formulas and f is a function : {TLR-formulas} + {arithmetical sentences}, then fa denotes the evaluator of M that assigns to each a E M the arithmetical sentence f (a(a)).
7.2. Remark. It follows easily from 2.5 that Cn(Tr) E II1 for any tree [Tr] of arithmetical sentences. Note also that Cn( F) (resp. Pr( rF1)) expresses that F is a sentence consistent with PA (resp. provable in PA).
In view of 3.7, Cn can also be regarded as a formalization of the predicate of tolerance over PA. (5) and (6) (MI, <, , 5, ) is II,-inconsistent.
By 2.5, fli-inconsistency of (MI, +, C,) means that there are f17,-sentences F, :a E M such that:
(1) PA 1 lF~oo~pt,, -czl; (2) for each a E M2, PA+ (ant/\ {Fb: u<,b}-,F,. Observe that since (M, <, a) E (M,, -$, a2) , by (2) and 2.5, we have:
Clearly we may suppose that each Fb E III! By formalizing in PA the argument that a false fli!-sentence cannot be consistent with PA, (3) implies: (4) for each a E M, PA 1 Cn(M, <, (t'),+ F,.
Taking into account that the axiom 4.2.4a is PA-valid, we have:
therefore, by (4), If not a =C1 d, then {Fb: a -$ b} = {Fb: u <I b}, and (*) follows from (1) at once. Finally, if a = d, (*) is just (6). Thus we have:
Now, (7) and (1) Proof. Let us fix a finite Visser countermodel (V', R', S', It-') for A. Without loss of generality we may assume that V' = (1, . . . , e} for some e 2 1, 1 R w for each 1 < w c e, and not 1 It A. Note that the function h is primitive recursive.
8
Lemma. (PA k:) 1fx my, then h(x) S h(y).
Proof. Immediately from 6.2.2-3 and the definition of h. 0 8.1.5. Lemma, (PA 1:) There is z such thatfor all z < z' c z", not h(z') R h(z").
Proof. Argue in PA. Suppose, for a contradiction, that for any z there are z<.z'<z"with h(z')Rh(z"); since, according to 8.1.4, h(z) S h(z'), we have by
that h(z) R h(z"). Thus, for any z there is t > z with h(z) R h(t). It means
that there is an infinite sequence w,Rw*R -. * . But this is impossible because V is finite and R is transitive and irreflexive. Cl 8.1.6. Lemma. (PA I-:) Suppose w is the limit of the function h, w R u, w R v and u S u. Then PA + L, is Ill-conservative over PA + L,.
Proof. Argue in PA. Assume the conditions of the lemma. We may suppose that v #u. Let F be any fl,!-sentence provable in PA + L,. Since w is the limit of h and every provable formula has arbitrary long proofs, we have PA t, L, -+ F for some y with h(y) = w. Clearly PA proves that y is the Giidel number of a PA-proof of L, * F and (as h is primitive recursive) h(y) = w. Now argue in PA + L,: Suppose F is false, i.e., there exists a regular counterwitness z for F. Since u is the limit of h, there is x with x > y, z and h(x) = h(x + 1) = U. Then, according to 8.1.3.2, the only reason for h(x + 1) = u (#u) can be the following:
there is a false n,-sentence F' (with a <x regular counterwitness) such that k_+ L,-+ F'. But 'we' (i.e., PA + L,) know that this does not hold. Consequently, F is true. Proof. In (a)-(e) we argue in PA.
(a): Let us fix the number z from 8.1.5. Then for each x 3 z, the transfer from h(x) to h(x + 1) is determined by 8.1.3.2 or 8.1.3.3. We claim that the case 8.1.3.2 (when x 3 z) can take place at most z times (whence automatically follows that h has a limit and this limit is, of course, one of the elements of V). Indeed, deny this claim. Let then X, < * . . <x,+, be exactly the first z + 1 numbers more or equal to z such that for each 1s i <z + 1, the transfer from h(q) to h(x, + 1) is determined by 8.1.3.2. Let for each 1 s i <z + 1, yj be the number y from 8.1.3.2 (putting x = xi). The irreflexivity of R implies z >y,; and, taking into account the reflexivity of S, it is easy to see that for each 1 s i s z, Y; >Yi+1. Thus It means that the transfer from h(x) to h(x + 1) can be determined only by 8.1.3.2. Then (*) implies that the number y from 8.1.3.2 is less than z. That is, there is a false 17,!-formula F such that for some y <z, Fv L,-+ F; but 'we' (i.e., PA + L,) know that this doesn't hold. 
Logic TLRo
Logic TLRw is an extension of TLR in the same language. The AXZOMS of TLRw are:
theorems of TLR; A -+ 0 (A) (for every TLR-formula A).
The rule of inference of TLRw is Modus Ponens. Then there is an evaluator p :M+ V such that for each a E M, 0 R P(a) (i.e., /3(u) = 1 or 1 R p(u)), P(a) IF a(u), and for all a < 6, P(a) S P(b). Observe that for each w E V, if 0 # w # 1, then, since 1 R W, we have not w S 1 by 6.2.1 and 6.2.4. It follows then that one of the following two cases takes place:
Notation. For any TLR-formula
Case 1: there is no a E M with P(a) = 1; Case 2: there is an initial part [M', <'I of [m, <] such that for each a EM', /3(u) = 1 and for each a E (M -M'), 1 R P(u).
In the case 1, 1 R /3(a) for each a E M, and clearly 1 It o(Tr). Now suppose that the case 2 takes place. Observe that then we have Let us observe now that 1 Ik A+ because not 1 II-A+* A. It follows from this by (1) that (2) lItO(c).
Let /3, be the evaluator of M' such that for each a E M', P,(u) = C. Using several times the axiom 4.2.4b, we have TLR k o(C) + 0(&f', <', pi), whence, Thus, TLRwIAeTLRtA++A and, since TLR is decidable (6.5), TLRw is decidable, too.
TLR and provability logic with propositional quantifiers
The language of provability logic contains, besides the symbols used in classical logic, the unary modal operator 0. Formulas of this language are considered as schemata of arithmetical formulas, where CIA is understood as a formalization of the assertion "A is provable (say, in PA)". Under this approach there arise two natural classes of modal formulas:
(1) class P of the modal formulas that are schemata of PA-provable arithmetical formulas, and (2) class T of the modal formulas that are schemata of true arithmetical formulas.
And the main task is to characterize these two classes -first and foremost, to determine their arithmetical complexities. The answer on this main question depends on what language is taken as the basic one to which the modal operator 0 is added.
If the basic language is that of propositional logic (without quantifiers), everything is 'smooth': as it was shown by Solovay [14] , both sets P and T are decidable. But if the language of predicate logic is taken as the basic one, the situation deteriorates at once: Vardanyan [16] showed that in this case the set P is not r.e., and before that Artemov [l] showed that the set T is not even arithmetical.
A different approach is taking the basic language to be a propositional language with quantifiers over propositions. There are several natural ways of doing this, and we do not know whether any of them leads to undecidability of P or T. Moreover, up to now there are not known any results concerning decidability of more or less considerable fragments of provability logic (i.e., the sets P and T) with propositional quantifiers, when the range of the latters is not restricted to some very specific class of arithmetical formulas. Theorem 10.6 below can be regarded as the first positive result of this kind.
Studying provability logic with propositional quantifiers, some restrictions or conditions are necessary to be taken. E.g., the formula q (Vp (Up-p)) hardly can have any reasonable interpretation, if 'Vp' is understpod as 'for any arithmetical formula p', because in this case the expression 'Vp (Clp 3~)' has no natural translation into arithmetic. This difficulty will be avoided, if the propositional variables range over arithmetical formulas of restricted complexity. Below we define a language, the quantifiers of which are interpreted as quantifiers over Z:,-sentences -the most interesting class of arithmetical formulas.
In language L, besides T and I, we have two sorts of atomic formulas:
(1) propositional letters: pl, p2, . . . ; as we see, the set of propositional letters of L coincides with that of the language of TLR;
(2) propositional variables that we denote by x, y, z, x1, x2, . . . , y,, y,, . . . . We suppose that the set of propositional variables of L coincides with the set of individual variables of PA. There is an effective mapping * that assigns to every L'-formula A a TLR-formula A* containing exactly the same propositional letters such that for every realization f, PA tfA ++fA*.
To prove this theorem, we need two Lemmas 10.7 and 10.8. Proof. It is enough to show that PA t F tf E, where F = f Vz q Bl(A, x, y, z) and E = f q (Bl(A, x, y, T) A Bl(A, x, y, I) ).
Since T, I E E,, the fact PA F F --f E is evident. Now, it is easy to see that (ii) there are x1, . . . , x, E E,! such that for each a E M, we have:
(1) a(a) kl(A{xj: i E a"} A A {lxi; i E (N -a')}).
(ii) j (i): Assume (ii). Taking 2.5 into account, it is enough to show that for if such an u" doesn't exist.
Let now for each 1 c i s IZ, xi be a X,!-sentence expressing that i E g(k) for some k. We want to show that then (1) holds.
First of all let us observe that (PA proves that) the function g has a limit; let Lim denote this limit. It is easy to see that each xi is PA-equivalent to the assertion that i E Lim. It follows that for each a E M, First we use Lemma 10.7 m times and obtain an L'-formula 3x LIBII(B, x) , where Bl, is a Boolean combination of B, x and for any realization f,
PA tfA ++f 3x q Bl,(B, n) .
LetN={l,..., n}, K=(l)..., k}, S be the set of all subsets of N and U be the set of all subsets of K. For each s E S and u E U, let s=/\{Xi:iES}A~{lXi:iE(N-s)} and ti = A {Bi: i E u} A /j {lBi: i E (K-u)}. Now, by propositional logic, there is a Boolean combination B12 of B, x that is a conjunction, each conjunct of which is Li--,+ for some s E S and u E U, such that Bl, (B, x) is tautologically equivalent to BII(B, x) . Let for each s E S, R, be the disjunction of all fi such that a++ is a conjunct of B& (B, x) . Then A {R, +3: s E S} is tautologically equivalent to Bl, (B, x) .
Thus for any realization f,
PAtf3x
BI,(B,x)t,f3xO(~{R,-,ls^:s ES}).
For each a E M, let a" be the very subset of N that is linearly ordered in a.
In the following three paragraphs we define a tree [M, <, a] of TLR-formulas Let M be the set of all linearly ordered subsets of N. For all a, 6 E M, let a < b iff b is a proper end-extension of a. By the induction hypothesis, BT is already defined for each Bi (1 s i =S k). Each R, (s E S) is a Boolean combination of B,, . . . , Bk, and, since * commutes with Boolean connectives, R: is also defined. Taking this remark into account, let CY be the evaluator of M which assigns to each a E M the TLR-formula R:, where s = u". Now, we define A* by setting A* =lO (M, <, a) . We want to show that for every realization f,
PA tf 3x q (A {R,++: s E S}) ++fA*. Let us fix a realization f and argue in PA. f 3x q l(A {R,-,+: s E S}) means that there are Z:,!-sentences x = xi, . . _ , x, such that for each s E S, PA tfR,+ 3; on the other hand, the induction hypothesis implies that PA EfRs *fR:; it means that for each s E S, PA + fR,T I+, and this, by Lemma 10.8, is equivalent to the assertion that (M, <, F) is f17,-inconsistent (recall notations 7.1.1 and 7.1.4). Thus, f 3x0 (/\ {R, +-S: s ES}) iff (M, <, f<) is IIT,-inconsistent. But " (M, <,G) is U i-inconsistent" means nothing else but that fA* is true. Thus, (3) holds. The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and 1A k?)A. We see that TOL has a simpler axiomatization than ELH. This is one more argument showing that the non-generalized, binary relation of weak interpretability is not quite natural.
In view of the interpretations of the logics TLR, TOL, ELH and GL and the corresponding arithmetical completeness theorems, we can say that TOL, ELH and GL are the 'linear', the 'binary' and the 'unary' fragments of TLR, respectively.
In particular, define a translation * from the languages of the logics GL, HGL-, ELH and TOL into the language of TLR by: * commutes with Boolean connectives; Then, if L is one of these four logics and A is a formula of the language of L, we have:
LkA iff TLRtA*.
Modulo the arithmetical completeness theorem, the following proposition implies that tolerance, in general, cannot be modal-logically defined in terms of linear tolerance and hence, TLR is an essential extension of TOL: Indeed, consider the two strengthened Visser models displayed in Fig. 3 , where each world forces only the indicated propositional letters (the S-arrows are also supposed to be reflexive).
It is easy to see that both models force precisely the same formulas of the language of TLR at the world w whereas we have w It O(Tr) in the first model and not w It O(7'r) in the other one. In view of the soundness of TLR with respect to Visser models, it follows that for no formula A of the language of TOL do we have TLRtA*++O(Tr).
A similar method can be used to prove that each logic between GL and TLR in Figure 2 is an essential extension of its predecessors.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 3.6b
In the following T and S are superarithmetical theories. By a 'translation' we mean a translation from the language of PA into the language of PA. A 'cointerpretation of S in T' means a translation that satisfies 3.3b. PC is pure predicate calculus. Notation and terminology not explained here are standard (cf. (i) a(x) binumerates T (i.e., the set of axioms of T) in S; (ii) if S !-PrU( rE1), then S t Pr, 1 ,J rE1) for some m (all E).
B.2. Lemma. Suppose (u(x) binumerates
T in S + Con,. There is then a translation t such that for all E, if S + Con, 1 tE, then S + Con, 1 Pra( rE1 ).
B.3. Lemma.
There is a translation t such that for all E, if S I-tE, then S 1 Pr, p ,( rE1) for some m.
Proof. Let us fix the formula (T(X) from Lemma B.l. According to (i), a(x) binumerates T in S and hence in S + Con,. Then, by Lemma B.2, there is a translation t such that for all E, (*) if S + Con, 1 tE, then S + Con, t PrJ rE1).
Suppose S t tE. Then S + Con, 1 tE and, by (*), S + Con, t PrO( rE1); on the other hand, we clearly have S + Xon, t Pr,( rE1); consequently, S t PrO( IE1 ). Then, by B.l(ii), S t Pr, 1 ,J rE1) for some m. Cl B.4. Lemma. Let E be a sentence and t be a translation with the relativizing formula 6(x) (see 3.1). Then Proof. Standard. Argue in PA.
Suppose Prf is a proof of E in pure predicate calculus, and let x1, . . . , x, be all the variables occurring free in Prf. Let then A = 6(x,) A . . . A 6(x,).
By induction on Prf, one can easily verify that PC I-A+ tE and hence (as E is closed) PC I-3A+ tE (34 denotes the existential quantifiers closure of A). On the other hand, PC 13~ 6(x)-, 34. Consequently, PC I-3x 6(x)+ tE. cl B.5. Theorem. The following are equivalent:
(i) S is cointerpretable in T.
(ii) Zf S 1 PrT I ,J rE1) for some m, then T 1 E (all E). (iii) S is _Z,-conservative over T.
